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DO AVE NEED A CODE OF EVIDENCE?
J. D . MORTON*
Toronto
Professor Graham Murray in his admirable article in the last
issue of this Review' urges us to consider the preparation of .a
code of evidence similar to the American "Uniform Rules of
Evidence" . He refers to the "hopelessly intricate subject which
we common lawyers call evidence" . The law of evidence, he main-
tains, can be "simple and sensible"? Professor Murray bases his
argument for reform on two propositions ; one of Thayer-"that
unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically
probative is admissible"' and one of Holmes "A body of law is
more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves
and the grounds for designing that end are stated or are ready to
be stated in words" .4 He deplores the fact that "most of us in
Canada, the United States and England have been taught to study
evidence as if its principles were designed to impede freedom of
proof" .5 It must be pointed out that the great Thayer himself
wrote :'
. . . the main errand of the law of evidence is to determine not so much
what is admissible in proof, as what is inadmissible . Assuming, in
general, that what is evidential is receivable, it is occupied in pointing
out what part of this mass of matter is excluded . It denies to this
excluded part not the name of evidence, but the name of admissible
evidence . Admissibility is determined, first by relevancy,-an affair of
logic and experience, and not at all of law; second, but only indirectly,
by the law of evidence, which declares whether any given matter which is
logically probative is excluded.
Thayer's "cornerstone",7 "that unless excluded by some rule or
*J. D . Morton, The Osgoode Hall Law School .
i Evidence : A Fresh Approach . The American Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1953), (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev . 576.s Ibid., at p . 576 .
	
' Ibid., at p . 585 .
4 Ibid., at p . 581 . e Ibid., at p . 585 .c A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898),
p . 268 . Italics mine.
7 Murray, op . cit., supra, footnote 1, at p. 585 .
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principle of law, all that is logically probative is admissible" can
not support a positive code of evidence . It is not possible to create
a positive code of "logic and experience and not at all of law".
An attempt to do so could only result in an eternally incompleted
structure of the Phipson school . A code of evidence, prefaced
though it may be by a positive proposition, must still be sub-
stantially negative in form in that it will declare what relevant
matter is to be excluded . On the question of relevancy we must
inevitably depend on the ordinary reasoning powers of Bench and
Bar. The necessity for reform will be determined by an examination
of whether, by Thayer's definition, the negative rules of evidence
can, by Holmes' test "be referred articulately and definitely to an
end which [they] subserve" .
It is the purpose of this article to consider whether some recent
decisions support or deny this necessity for reform and, if so,
whether reform by codification would be desirable .
1. Admissibility of Confessions
R. v. La Plante 8 imports the notorious Hammond' case into Can-
adian criminal law. At the trial of La Plante, a voir dire was held
to determine the admissibility of an alleged confession . One of the
grounds of appeal was that answers made by the accused to ques-
tions put by the Crown on the voir dire showing that the contents
of the statement made by him were true were not properly admis-
sible in evidence on the voir dire . Laidlaw J.A . delivering the judg-
ment of the court held that the answers were properly admitted :
The evidence given by the accused in cross-examination . . . that the
statements made by him were true, touches the issue of credibility .
Likewise, the admission by him that he killed Edwin Jones [with whose
murder La Plante was charged] touches the matter of his credibility,
and his answers in respect of both matters to the questions put by
counsel for the Crown were relevant to the issue as to whether or not
the statements made by him were voluntary.
The point of holding a voir dire is to keep from the jury the
knowledge that the accused is alleged to have made a confession
until the judge has had an opportunity to determine whether or
not the confession is voluntary.
The material question consequently is whether the confession has been
obtained by the influence of hope or fear ; and the evidence to this
point being in its nature preliminary, is addressed to the judge . . . . 10
8 [1958] O.W.N. 80 (C.A .).
R. v. Hammond, [1941] 3 All E.R. 318 (C.A .) .
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Evidence to be admissible must be relevant to a material issue.
According to Rand J. the material issue on the voir dire is "whether
the statement is that of aman free in volition from the compulsions
or inducements of authority."" Although, the rule is frequently
based on an alleged doubt that is cast on a statement improperly
induced, in no British or Canadian case has the issue on the
voir dire been stated to be the truth or falsity of the statement. In
considering the correctness of the ruling of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in La Plante, we must therefore take it that the only issue
was whether the statementwasmade without improper inducement.
Was the evidence as to its truth relevant to such issue? One thing
is certain : the American Uniform Rules of Evidence will not pro-
vide an answer, rule 63(6) on the subject of confessions offering
only a rule of admissibility in terms substantially identical with
that found in the cases. How then are we to find an answer? Even
if we concede the application of the doctrine of precedent to such
a problem, there was at the time, no binding decision .
La Plante swore that the statement had been improperly ob-
tained, his credibility thereby being brought into issue. Was the
truth of the confession relevant to the issue of his credibility?
Here we must use logic and experience. The question was asked
by the Crown on cross-examination and, according to Laidlaw
J.A. touched the issue of credibility-it must be taken that the
Crown was attacking the accused's credibility . The question, "Is
the statement true?" can be answered affirmatively or negatively.
If answered negatively, no inference as to credibility is possible
pending the outcome of the trial proper ; if answered affirmatively,
the answer would appear to support the credibility of the accused
in that he is demonstrated to be one who will disclose unfavourable
facts under oath . Surely it cannot be contended that it is proper
for the Crown to put a question, the answer to which can have
only one direct result, to support the credibility of the accused ;
having at the same time a most powerful indirect result in that from
the admission forward, the trial judge knows that the accused
admits the truth of something offered as a confession. Even though
the confession be rejected, this knowledge may well affect the trial
judge in his subsequent conduct of the case and in his ability to
give an impartial summing-up . In the case of a trial without a
jury, where such a question is asked and answered affirmatively,
the accused is deprived of his hallowed privilege against self-in-
"Boudreau v. The King (1949), 94 C.C.C. 1, at p. 8 .
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crimination, in that it would suppose super-human qualities in a
judge to expect that he could ignore the admission."
This conclusion that the evidence was wrongly admitted on the
issue of credibility is based on reason . It is submitted that the
need here is for clear thinking, not precedent or codes. Similarly,
on the proposition of Laidlaw J.A . that the answers were relevant
to the issue as to whether or not the statements made by the ac-
cused were voluntary, it is submitted that no logical connection
exists in the absence of a generally observed rule of experience
that truthful confessions are more or less likely to be improperly
induced than false confessions.
It is interesting to note that when the problem arose in the
course of a voir dire before the Saskatachewan Court of Queen's
Bench," Hall C.J . refused to follow the La Plante and Hammond
decisions referring to the "guise of credibility" 11 and the well
settled proposition that "the issue in a trial within a trial is the
admissibility of the confession and not the truth of it.""
This restriction of the judge's function on the voir-dire to the
admissibility and not the truth of the confession is supported by
the first case to be considered under the next topic .
II. The Proper Functions of Judge and Jury
Under the previous topic, some matters of what Professor Murray
would call "ordinary horse-sense" have been discussed . Here, some
technical matters will be considered .
R. v . McAloon" concerned the proper direction to a jury as
to the tests to be applied by them to an alleged confession . It has
been submitted that the judge, in his capacity as arbiter of admissi-
bility, must apply certain tests to determine whether or not the
alleged confession is to go before the jury. The question before the
court in McAloon was whether the jury was to be directed to apply
the same tests . Clearly the jury must decide whether an alleged
confession was, in fact, made. Having so decided, they must,
before acting upon it, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was true . Need they also be directed to apply the tests of "hope
and fear" and to reject the confession completely if they are not
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was that of a "man
free in volition from the compulsions or inducements of author-
ity"? 1' It was clear from R. v. Mulligan" that, the trial judge hav-
12 But see R . v. Shepherd, [1951] O.W.N . 311 .
la R . v . Hnedish (1959), 29 C.R . 347 .
14 Ibid., at p. 350 . 15 Ibid.
is [1959] O.W.N . 203 (C.A.) .
17 Boudreau v. The King, supra, footnote 11, at p . 8 .
is [1955] O.R . 240 (C.A .) .
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ing admitted an alleged confession, defence counsel was entitled
to cross-examine witnesses before the jury as to the circumstances
under which it was alleged to have been made. R. v. Bass 19 had
decided that in such circumstances the trial judge must direct the
jury to reject the confession even if they thought it true, if they
were not satisfied that it was voluntary .
The Ontario Court of Appeal refusing to follow the Bass case,
held that, once admitted, the statement was "in the same position
as any other relevant and admissible evidence . . ." ; in other words,
the circumstances of the making of the alleged confession may be
disclosed to the jury in order that they may determine, firstly if it
was actually made and secondly if it was true .
How can this decision be tested? Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules
merely provides that the rule that a judge must, if requested, hold
a voir dire on the admissibility of a confession "shall not be con
strued to limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility" . Rule 63(6) already
cited does not refer to the function of the jury . It is submitted that
once again a code would only help by way of an express rule and
as such would be of no more help than a precedent. The decision
must be tested by reference to the general division of functions
between judge and jury . Despite the traditional reliance upon the
doubtfulness of an improperly induced confession as a basis for
its exclusion, it would seem that there is another reason for keeping
out confessions improperly obtained . There is a clear sense of
fairness implicit in the cases. It might not be exaggerated to say
that there is a public policy against third-degree methods and that
the courts have implemented this policy by rejecting evidence ob-
tained under reprehensible conditions even though the evidence
might well be true . In this view, the test of voluntariness involves
the implementation of this public policy and the trial judge is.
therefore to ask himself:
(1) Is there evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find.
that this statement was made?
(2) Is there evidence upon which a reasonable jury might find .
it true?
(3) Am I satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there are.
no circumstances, quite apart from its truth or falsity,.
which would compel me to reject the confession on the
grounds of this public policy?
The public interest being adequately secured by the preliminary,
19 [19531 1 Q.S. 680 (C.A.) .
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testing on the voir dire, a confession will put to the jury on the
questions of existence and truth only . 2 ° It is conceded that such
cases as R. v . McNamara" on the admissibility of improperly
obtained real evidence do not appear to bear out the existence of
the public policy here argued, but it is noteworthy that in none of
the reports does there appear mention of such impropriety as
would compel exclusion under question three above. In assenting
to the McNamara doctrine in his judgment in A.-G. for Quebec v.
Begin ,22 Kerwin C.J . was at pains to point out that there was "no
suggestion in the present case that any force had been exercised" .
It is not over-optimistic to believe that a Canadian court would
follow Rochin v . California 23 if faced with the question of the
admissibility of evidence obtained from an accused by the force-
able application of a stomach pump.
What we need here, if anything, is not a code but an articulately
stated end to be subserved .
One of the perennial problems in the field of evidence has been
the definition of "burden of proof" and the consequent dispute as
to whether more than one legal notion is concealed under this
one title. I have come in for my own share of abuse, in that I
have persistently advocated a retitling of the two separate legal
risks of non-persuasion and non-production under the rubrics
"Primary" and "Secondary burdens" . Indeed as recently as July
of last year, I was described as a "long-haired egghead" for so
advocating," the same critic describing my analysis as "[riding] off
on a hobby horse of his own in some subtle division of burden of
proof . . . ." 25 In these circumstances, it wouldbe asking too much
of me that I should view the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Rose v . the Queen 26 with anything but gratification. In
that case the appellant had been tried and acquitted of criminal
negligence by a trial judge sitting alone. The Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of Alberta quashed the judgment of acquit-
tal and ordered a new trial.21 The question before the Supreme
Court of Canada was the right of the Crown to appeal in such
circumstances . The acquittal had not been the result of a motion
21 The McAloon decision may be supported on the further practical
ground that under the Bass rule, a court of appeal does not know whether
the jury in convicting found the confession voluntary or not. See Stein v.
New York (1953), 346 U.S . 156 .
21 [19511 O.R . 6 . 22 [19551 S.C.R . 593 .
23 (1951), 342 U.S. 165 .
24 (1959), 8 Chitty's Law Journal 193 .
2e (1959), 2 Crim.L.Q . 199 . 26 [19591 S.C.R . 441 .
27 (1959), 122 C.C.C . 185 .
1960]
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to dismiss as in R. v. Morabito2s but had come after the defence
had declared that it had no evidence to offer and the case was
complete. Clearly, from Morabito, a dismissal from a motion to
dismiss is "a matter of law alone" within section 584 of the Crimi-
nal Code, which limits the right to appeal an acquittal to grounds
that "involve a matter of law alone" .
There are two hurdles which the prosecution must clear in any
criminal case
(1) the Crown must introduce evidence upon which a reason-
able jury properly directed might convict. The judge will
determine as a matter of law whether or not they have
satisfied this test. The risk of failing this test has been
referred to as the "secondary burden of proof". ,
(2) having passed test (1), the Crown must persuade the trier
(jury or judge sitting alone) beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused . This risk of losing on a reasonable
doubt has been referred to as the "primary burden of
proof" .
Taschereau J. delivering the judgment of the court in the Rose
case held in part :
. . . I have reached the conclusion that appellant's argument on this
point must prevail, as the question raised was not a matter of law
alone.
. . . The trial judge sitting without a jury was fulfilling a dual
capacity . He had, therefore, to discharge the duties attached to the
functions of a judge, and also the duties of a jury . As a judge he had
to direct himself as to whether any facts had been established by
evidence from which criminal negligence may reasonably be inferred .
As a jury, he had to say whether from those facts submitted, criminal
negligence ought to be inferred. [cases cited] . I think that the trial judge
directed himself properly, and that when he decided on the facts sub-
mitted to him that criminal negligence ought not to be inferred, he
was fulfilling the function of a jury on a question offact.2s
The Uniform Rules treat these two tests in substantially similar
language under the titles "Burden of Proof" and "Burden of Pro-
ducing Evidence ."
Rule 1(4) : "Burden of Proof" means the obligation of a party to meet
the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved either by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence
or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be . Burden of proof is
synonymous with "burden of persuasion" .
Rule 1(5) : "Burden of Producing Evidence" means . the obligation of
a party to introduce evidence when necessary to avoid the risk_of a
21 [19491 S.C.R . 172.
42
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL. XXXVIII
directed verdict or peremptory finding against him on a material issue
of fact.
From the Rose case it would appear that the Supreme Court of
Canada needs no help from a code on this area of evidence .
111 . Corroboration
R. v . Ethier3 ° was an appeal by the accused from a conviction for
rape . The facts as taken from the report, were the following :
The complainant gave evidence that she accepted a drive home from
the accused whom she had never seen before. She entered his car and
in the course of conversation they exchanged names . He did not drive
her directly home but turned off the main highway into a lonely road
leading to a dump, stopped the car and then committed the alleged
offence. He then drove her home. Upon her arrival there she told her
mother and father what had occurred, giving them the name of the
accused and the licence number, year and make of the accused's car .
At the trial she gave evidence that there were foot marks on the ceiling
of the car made by her while she was being assaulted and that the
interior handle of the left door was missing. There was medical and
scientific evidence of the complainant's condition and stains on the
clothing of the complainant and of the accused. The accused, his car
and clothing all answered the complainant's description of them . The
accused gave evidence denying that he had anything to do with the
complainant on the evening of the assault and that the first time he
saw her was at the police line-up . He described his movements during
the evening, and his evidence in this particular was supported by other
defence witnesses.31
At the conclusion of the argument the court allowed the appeal
and directed a new trial for the reasons subsequently given by
Morden J.A. speaking for the whole court. The learned judge
pointed out that there were two issues at this trial : Hadthe offence
of rape been committed? And, had it been committed by the
accused? He went on to point out that on both issues the burden
rested on the Crown and that, in the circumstances, the trial
judge must warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict in the absence
of corroboration . The court endorsed the definition of corrobora-
tion in R. v. Baskerville" that the evidence must tend to show that
the crime was committed and that it was committed by the ac-
cused, and emphasised that evidence which is confirmatory of the
complainant's evidence in one area may not so qualify in another .
One of the grounds on which a new trial was ordered was that the
trial judge failed to distinguish the two issues, crime and identity,
and as a result misdirected the jury on corroboration.
29 Supra, footnote 26, at pp . 442-3, italics partly mine .
10 [19591 O.R . 533 (C.A.) . 31 Ibid., at p . 534 .
32 [1916] 2 K.B . 658 (C.C.A .) .
1960]
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The trialjudge had directed the jury that they might find corro-
boration in respect of the following : (1) the human blood on the
accused's shorts, (2) hair found in the car was similar to the girl's,
(3) the handle on the car was broken, (4) the person who assaulted
her was wearing brown pants and a checkered shirt, (5) the licence
number of the car, (6) the bruise on her left cheek, (7) the marks
on the ceiling of his car, (8) her emotional condition upon arriving
at home.
Morden J.A . held :
. . . Upon either issue many of the above items of evidence were not
capable of being corroborative upon the short ground that they lacked
the essential quality of being independent : Hubin v. The King, [1927]
S.C.R . 442 . 1 refer particularly to the evidence identifying the accused
and his car .
On the issue whether or not the crime of rape was committed, the
condition of the girl and of her clothing were matters which were
independent of her story . There is no absolute rule that such evidence
is or is not capable of being corroborative upon this issue . This difficult
matter is fully discussed by Aylesworth, J.A ., in Reg. v . Harrison,
[1956] O.R . 509. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case and, in my view, would turn in large measure upon the extent of
the girl's physical injuries, her emotional condition and damage to
her clothing . It would be a matter to be decided by a trial Judge whether
such evidence in all the circumstances of the case before him was
sufficiently cogent to be left to the jury as possible corroboration :
Reg. v. Huffman, [1958] 28 C.R . 1, at pp . 16-8, 120 C.C.C . 323, at
p . 333 .
The second issue-the identity of the accused-was at the trial
the more vital issue of the two . The accused denied that he had had
anything to do with the girl upon the evening in question. With all
respect to the learned trial Judge, the matters mentioned by him were
not capable of being corroborative of the girl's testimony on this
issue . As I have said, many of the matters mentioned by the learned
trial Judge depended solely upon her evidence to connect the accused
with the alleged crime . I refer to her description of the accused and
of his car. The condition of the girl and of her clothing were indepen-
dently proved, but this evidence was equally consistent with the truth
as with the falsity of her story on the issue of identity : Thomas v .
The Queen, [1952] 2 S.C.R ., at p . 354 . The scienific evidence with
respect to the hair found in the car and type of blood found upon the
clothing of the girl and of the accused failed by the same test . . . .
In my opinion, the evidence pointed out to the jury as capable of
being corroborative did not so qualify because (a) much of it was not
independent of the complainant and (b) that which was, did not
connect or tend to connect the accused with the crime . In short, the
jury should have been told that there was no corroboration. The
evidence which the learned trial Judge pointed out as possible corro-
boration was, however, admissible evidence in the case. Much of it, if
44
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believed by the jury, could have been considered by them as adding
to the credibility of the girl's story, but it was not corroborative of
i t . . . ." 33
I propose to examine only that part of the judgment dealing
with the evidence identifying the accused. It will have been noted
that the defence as stated by Morden J.A. was that the accused
"denied that he had had anything to do with the girl upon the even-
ing in question" .34 In the facts as set out by the reporter it is stated
that "the accused gave evidence denying that he had anything to
do with the complainant on the evening of the assault and that the
first time he saw her was at the police line-up." 36 From the tran-
script" it is clear that the defence was that the accused did not
know the girl at all and had never seen her until the police line-up.
The rule requiring a warning against convicting of rape on the
uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, is based on long ex-
perience of cases of this type. In this area there is great danger of
false accusation and from the knowledge of this danger came the
common law rule now enacted in the Criminal Code." The danger
is that the complainant will tell a fabricated story which will re-
sult in the conviction of the accused.
Evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which
affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the
crime . . . which confirms in some material particular . . . that the
prisoner committed [the crime] .V
It is submitted that, by "independent", Lord Reading meant
"not capable of having been fabricated by the complainant" . In
Hubin v . The King," the evidence offered as corroboration was
"her statement that a certain licence number was that carried by
the car in which she was conveyed to the scene of the crime and
her subsequent identification of a cushion found in the car bearing
that number."" Anglin C.J.C . held that this was not independent
evidence in that the facts were inadmissible only by reason of the
girl's own story connecting them with the crime.41 The application
of the test is clear. The complainant might have selected the ac-
cused as victim and used the licence number of his car in a fabri-
cated story. On being shown a car bearing the number, she might
then have falsely identified it by reference to a cushion.
33 Supra, footnote 30, at pp . 537-538 .
34 Ibid., at p. 537, italics mine . 35 Ibid., at p . 534, italics mine .
36 Examination in chief of the accused, at p . 217 .
17 S . 134 .
33 R. v. Baslcerville, supra, footnote 32, at p . 667 .




Do We Need A Code ofEvidence? 45
Hubin v . The King was relied upon by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in holding that the evidence in R. v. Ethier 42 did not
satisfy this test of independence . It is submitted that the key to
Ethier is the denial of the accused that he knew the girl at all.
Before considering identity it would be necessary for the jury to
conclude that the girl had been raped by someone. The issue would
then be : Did Ethier do it? The complainant swore that he did.
Did any of the evidence qualify as independent evidence tending
to connect himwith the crime? Clearly hadthe complainant merely
given the licence number and, on being shown the accused's car,
identified it with reference to the broken handle and the marks
upon the ceiling, her story would have lacked the essential quality
of independence. However, the complainant described the broken
handle and the marks, before the car was taken by the police . The
description of the car was demonstrated to be accurate . For it to
form part of a fabricated story, the complainant must have had
detailed knowledge of the interior prior to the charge. The accused
denied that he had ever seen the girl before and there was no
suggestion that she might have had an opportunity to observe the
interior without his knowledge. It is submitted, with deference,
that corroboration on identity might have been found in respect,
at least, of the broken door handle and the marks on the ceiling;
corroboration in this respect being found not merely in the com-
plainant's evidence but jointly in that of the police officer who
testified that her description was accurate and in that of the ac-
cused that he did not know the girl.
As the Court of Appeal noted, there is no absolute rule that
evidence of the condition of the girl or her clothing is or is not
capable of being corroborative on the issue of whether or not the
crime was committed .0 Similarly, it is submitted that there is no
absolute rule as to what evidence may amount to corroboration
on the issue of identity. The Ontario Court of Appeal says that
the evidence here could not be corroborative ; I submit that it
could ; the Uniform Rules say nothing!
Conclusion
Nothing has been said about R. v. Hiller,44 in which O'Halloran
J.A . admitted opinion evidence on very much the same terms as
permitted by rule 56(1) of the Uniform Rules, and many other
12 Supra, footnote 30 .
43 R. v. Harrison, [1956] O.R .' 509 (C.A.) and R: v . Thoinas, [1952]
2 S.C.R . 344.
44 (1959), 125 C.C.C . 8 (B.C.C.A.) .
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important Canadian cases on evidence decided during the last
year. Enough has been covered, it is hoped, to indicate that Pro-
fessor Murray may be over-pessimistic about the current state of
evidence and over-optimistic about the therapeutic effect of a code .
Codes, not merely suggested but enacted, exist in many countries
using the Anglo-American system of trial.46 Indeed in Canada,
during the past year we have acquired a code of our own, of
limited application it is true . In the Canada Gazette, Part Il, dated
Wednesday, September 9th, 1959,46 there appear the "Regulations
Respecting The Rules of Evidence at Trial by Court Martial" .
Examination of these rules must await another opportunity. That
there is material for another article is demonstrated by one short
quotation from the section entitled "Evidence of Similar Facts"
s .22(2) When attempting to prove the charge against the accused, the
prosecutor shall establish a real suspicion of the guilt of the accused
on issues of state of mind or identity with evidence other than that of
essentially similar acts of the accused, before he may introduce evidence
of essentially similar acts of the accused .
A code may answer some questions, at the same time posing some
problems .
46 Nokes, Codification of the Law of Evidence in Common Law Juris-
dictions (1956), 5 Int. and Comp. L.Q. 347.
11 Vol . 93, no . 17.
